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Abstract 
 
 
One of the most striking developments in the penal system in England and Wales is 
the increasing use of the polygraph by probation services. Despite severe criticism 
from scientific institutions and academic discourse, the legal order increasingly 
deploys the long-discredited polygraph in order to extract adverse statements from 
released offenders. Our article is structured as follows: First, we summarise the 
statutory and regulatory framework for the current use of the polygraph in the 
monitoring of sex offenders released on licence, and the proposed expansion of the 
polygraph testing regime as set out in the Domestic Abuse Bill and the Counter-
Terrorism and Sentencing Bill respectively. We then review our findings in respect of 
governing policies and procedures uncovered by our FOI-based research, 
highlighting the concerning lack of consistency in respect of both practice and 
procedure. In the subsequent sections we set out the main arguments deployed by 
polygraph proponents, and posit our view that none of these arguments can 
withstand scrutiny. We conclude by proposing a moratorium on any further use of the 
polygraph by the State, in order to thoroughly evaluate its effect on the integrity of 
the legal order, human rights and, more generally, the Rationalist aspirations of the 
penal system. In addition, and given already existing law, we propose a process of 
independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of the polygraph in licence recall 
decisions and other situations impacting individual rights, especially police 
investigations triggered by polygraph test results. 
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“The polygraph—or lie detector, to use its more homely name— 
is not new, nor to my mind is it very English”  
Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
 
Introduction 
 
Managing to separate –in a reliable way— truth from lies has been a dream of 
mankind since ancient times. It has shaped mythology, philosophy, literature and 
fiction. For example, the Greek god Momus criticised Prometheus, i.e. the creator of 
humans, for not hanging the latter’s heart on the outside so that lies can be detected 
and thoughts can be read.1 As a result of his criticism, Momus was, so the myth 
goes, expelled from the gods. What is more, humans remain to this day opaque, so 
that others carry on the struggle to rationalise human understanding in relation to 
truthful/deceptive behaviour. From Mary Poppins who uses an Oral Thermometer to 
detect naughty behaviour to Wonder Woman whose powerful weapon, i.e. the lasso 
of truth, can force those bound within it to disclose information, to the polygraph ( the 
prototype of which was designed by the creator of Wonder Woman)2, people still feel 
the need to look into each others’ soul. The aforementioned Momus’ criticism of 
Prometheus’ handiwork lies at the heart of modern developments in the law of 
England and Wales as regards the use of the polygraph by police forces and 
probation services. 
 
It may come as a surprise even to criminal lawyers that the polygraph, alias ‘lie 
detector’ as it is commonly known and understood by courts in England and Wales,3 
has been deployed by the penal system for over a decade in England and Wales. 
Pursuant to the Offender Management Act 2007, lie-detector tests are currently in 
use by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (hereinafter: HMPPS) in order to 
monitor sex offenders released on licence and manage compliance with their licence 
conditions. The remit of the polygraph test is expected to expand with similar 
provisions in the 2020 Domestic Abuse Bill and the Counter-Terrorism and 
Sentencing Bill respectively. Furthermore, the latter Bill includes polygraph testing as 
a method of monitoring compliance with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (TPIM) and leaves open the possibility that statements made in the course 
of compulsory polygraph testing can be used to secure a TPIM following the end of 
an offender’s licence, a consequence that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation has described as ‘potentially oppressive’.4 
 
Now, the question is: How is it even possible for the polygraph to gradually gain 
traction –again? We cannot stress enough that ever since the first deployment of the 
polygraph, appelate courts,5 scientific organisations,6 and last but not least academic 
 
1 See Plato’s dialogue, Protagoras, 320D-322A. 
2 For a concise introduction see Ken Alder, The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), p. xiii et passim. 
3 See e.g. Corbett v. (1) The Secretary of State for Justice (2) The National Offender Management 
Service [2009] EWHC 2671 (Admin), at [8] per LJ Pill. 
4 Jonathan Hall QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation ‘Note on Counter-Terrorism and 
Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (2)’ 4 June 2020, para 25. 
5 See only Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
6 See e.g. National Research Council [USA], Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the 
Polygraph, 2003; see also [U.S. Congress] Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of 
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discourse have continuously and nearly unanimously criticised, and rejected this 
method as unscientific. What is more, the very research program in psychology (i.e. 
introspection) which propelled the polygraph into existence has been widely 
discredited as unscientific due to its lack of methodology, indefensible empirical 
basis and deficient validity.7 Our research into recent developments in the 
deployment of the polygraph has therefore focused upon three main issues: 
 
1. For what purposes is the polygraph deployed by the police and probation 
services in England and Wales? 
2. What policies and procedures govern its use? 
3. How is the use of polygraph justified by its proponents from an inferential and 
legal perspective? 
 
Our investigation into (1) and (2) has been based on publicly available 
documentation, enhanced with the results of freedom of information (FOI) requests 
sent to the Ministry of Justice (in respect of HMPPS), the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council and all UK based police forces, thus providing us with points of comparison 
between the situation in England and Wales and the other jurisdictions. This 
investigation has informed our conclusions in respect of (3): the arguments used by 
proponents and deployers of the polygraph to justify its use by the State, all of which, 
we contend, fall down (and raise additional concerns) when subjected to detailed 
critique. These arguments can be broken down into the following five main 
categories: 
• The utility argument: the use of the polygraph is only concerned with, and 
supposedly justified by obtaining more disclosures from offenders; 
• The corroboration-rule argument: a polygraph-test-result is yet another piece 
of information to be taken into account; 
• The non-oppression argument: besides the detection of deception through the 
polygraph, the interviewee may freely choose to disclose information without 
being subject to any form of oppressive behaviour; 
• The containment-argument: concerns around the use of the polygraph from a 
criminal justice evidential perspective are not applicable to use in probation, 
investigative or TPIMs contexts; 
• The expertise argument: polygraph practitioners are highly regulated and 
trained on a legitimate and valid (scientific) method; 
• The human rights argument: even if human rights articles may be engaged, 
any infringements can be justified. 
We believe that the creeping ‘invasion’ of the polygraph into the criminal justice 
system should not be permitted to proceed any further. Indeed, its use should be 
 
Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation, A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-H-15 
(1983). The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981 had considered the introduction of the 
polygraph test into England and Wales. Their conclusion however was that the polygraph’s ‘lack of 
certainty from an evidential point of view told against its introduction in this country for the purpose of 
court proceedings’ (para. 4.76). 
7 A report from the British Psychological Society (1986: Report of the Working Group on the Use of 
the Polygraph in Criminal Investigation and Personnel Screening. Bulletin of the British Psychological 
Society 39, pp. 81-94) argued that the polygraph was unscientific. 
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banned because of its invalidity and the dangerousness of pretending that a machine 
can deduce truth. 
While there has been a) extensive discussion on the methodological, technical and 
professional requirements for forensic areas of expertise –these discussions have 
inter alia led to new standards of admissibility in English and Welsh criminal courts 
as regards reliability8– and soft law instruments9 and b) considerable criticism of 
algorithmically generated tools which purport to ‘detect’ personality or emotions 
based on facial features, gait or other physical attributes,10 the current use of the 
polygraph  in contexts in which fundamental individual rights are at stake has been 
largely overlooked.11 We can only speculate on possible reasons for this alarming 
development; perhaps actuarial/utilitarian technological approaches are perceived as 
more acceptable when applied to sex, domestic violence and terrorism offenders: 
The acceptability of oppressive and unreliable techniques aiming at the extraction of 
confession statements might increase when these techniques are applied to people 
involved in morally reprehensible behaviour. Our overall aim is to demonstrate why 
we should be concerned about these developments, and to highlight the convincing 
counter-arguments to those presented by polygraph proponents as set out above. 
Our article is structured as follows. First, we summarise the statutory and regulatory 
framework for the current use of the polygraph in the monitoring of sex offenders 
released on licence, and the proposed expansion of the polygraph testing regime as 
set out in the Domestic Abuse Bill and the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 
respectively. We comment upon the initial evaluations of polygraph usage that were 
conducted alongside the polygraph provisions in the Offender Management Act 2007 
(the 2007 Act). We then review our findings in respect of governing policies and 
procedures uncovered by our FOI-based research, highlighting the concerning lack 
of consistency in respect of both practice and procedure. The subsequent sections 
represent the meat of our article, in which we set out the main arguments deployed 
by polygraph proponents, and posit our view that none of these arguments can 
withstand scrutiny. We conclude by proposing a moratorium on any further use of the 
polygraph by the State, in order to thoroughly evaluate its effect on the integrity of 
the legal order, human rights and, more generally, the Rationalist aspirations of the 
penal system. In addition, and given already existing law, we propose a process of 
independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of the polygraph in licence recall 
decisions and other situations impacting individual rights, especially police 
investigations triggered by polygraph test results. 
 
8 R v Dlugosz and Others [2013] EWCA Crim 2, at [11] – emphasis added; see Tony Ward, 
Explaining and trusting expert evidence: What is a ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’? In: E&P 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712720927622. 
9 See The Criminal Practice Directions 2015 V Evidence 19A. 
10 See the National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences 
Community, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, 2009, for a 
general introduction to the topic; see also D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and 
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, in: 82 Iowa L. Rev 
(1996), pp. 21-74. 
11 For an account of historical and current analogies, see Marion Oswald Technologies in the twilight 
zone: early lie detectors, machine learning and reformist legal realism, 34 International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology (2020), pp. 214-231, DOI: 10.1080/13600869.2020.1733758. 
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Statutory Framework for the Use of the Polygraph Test in England and Wales 
Sections 28–30 of the 2007 Act enable a polygraph condition to be inserted in the 
release licence of certain adult sexual offenders as specified in the Act. More 
specifically, s.29 states that a qualifying released person must participate in 
polygraph sessions with a view to monitoring his compliance with the other 
conditions of his release; or improving the way in which he is managed on release. 
These offenders must participate in the aforementioned sessions at times given and 
must do exactly as they are told throughout the test. S.29(3) adumbrates polygraph 
examinations and enumerates the latter’s procedural elements: 
a) the polygraph operator questions the released person; 
b) the questions and the released person’s answers are recorded; and 
c) physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned are 
measured and recorded by means of equipment of a type approved by the Secretary 
of State. 
S.30(1) of the 2007 Act stipulates that evidence of any matter mentioned during the 
polygraph session may not be used in any proceedings against the interviewee (i.e. 
released offender) for an offence. The aforementioned matters could be either: 
 
a) statements made by the released person while participating in a polygraph 
session, or  
b) any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the 
course of a polygraph examination.12 
 
Furthermore, according to the ‘Polygraph Examination Instructions’ (hereafter: PEI) 
an indication of deception (hereafter: DI) is not in itself a breach of the licence 
condition: 
 
‘Any statement made or physiological reaction of the released person during the 
polygraph session would not be evidence that the released person had breached 
his/her licence condition and should not lead to enforcement proceedings being 
undertaken’. 
 
Accordingly, enforcement proceedings due to breach of licence may follow, only if 
the offender ‘admits to, or disclose about behaviour that would constitute a breach’.13 
In addition to use immunity granted to the interviewee by s. 30. we also seem to 
have a corroboration rule at play, according to which the result of the polygraph 
examination cannot be used as an exclusive basis for decisions on the management 
of sex offenders. 
The legislative framework also includes the Polygraph Rules 200914 which govern 
the qualifications of polygraph operators in this context (specifically, training 
 
12 s.30(2)(a-b) of the 2007 Act. 
13 See NOMS [as it then was] - Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for Imposing Licence Conditions 
for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders. Appendix 1 - Polygraph Examinations: Guidance for Offender 
Managers to ensure appropriate sexual offenders on licence are made subject to the additional 
licence condition to undergo polygraph examinations, Appendix ,1 para 2.92 and 2.93, 3.41. 
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accredited by the American Polygraph Association), administration and review of the 
test, and the ways that the results are reported to the offender and the offender 
manager. 
During Parliamentary debate of the Offender Management Bill, Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
commented that the polygraph was not ‘very English. It has been in use in the United 
States for a long time, mostly by the CIA in vetting candidates for employment. But 
even in the USA the polygraph is regarded as controversial, not just because it is 
highly intrusive on personal privacy, which may matter less in the case of an offender 
on licence, but because there is no scientific way of establishing the accuracy of the 
polygraph as an indicator of the truth. In quite a large percentage of cases it will fail 
to show up those who are lying, resulting in the so-called ‘false negative’, while in 
another large percentage it will show up people as lying who are not in fact doing so, 
resulting in the so-called ‘false positive’.15 
This fundamental concern was neatly sidestepped in the evaluation of the pilot 
program of mandatory polygraph testing carried out in the East and West Midlands 
regions pursuant to the 2007 Act. The evaluation study focused instead exclusively 
on whether there had been more ‘clinically significant disclosures’16 (hereafter: CSD) 
in the polygraph group than in a comparison group, i.e. on the utility of the 
polygraph. Most importantly, the study focused on the sheer number of CSDs, not on 
their truth-conducive, or lawful character. The evaluation concluded that there were 
more CSDs made in the polygraph groups, and that offenders receiving their first 
polygraph test made more disclosures if their test result was DI (although this 
difference dissipated on subsequent tests when offenders received less DI as test 
results).17 The report’s authors highlighted at the same time a number of caveats, 
including the risk that the self-reporting of disclosures by offender managers might 
mean that those using the polygraph felt expected to report large numbers of 
disclosures.18 
Despite such caveats, and the critical points expressed in parliamentary debates, to 
wit, that this pilot should ‘not lay down any preconditions for its use in any other 
circumstances’,19 a polygraph licence condition can now be imposed on any eligible 
sex offender if necessary and proportionate.20 Furthermore, the Domestic Abuse Bill, 
subject to a 3-year pilot of mandatory polygraph examination of domestic abuse 
 
14 UK SI 2009 No. 619. 
15 Lord Lloyd of Berwick, HL Deb 12 June 2007, vol. 692, col 1583- 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2007-06-
12/debates/07061259000002/OffenderManagementBill?highlight=polygraph#contribution-
07061268000031 (last accessed: 15/07/2020). 
16 Defined in the evaluation as ‘new information that the offender discloses, which leads to a change 
in how they are managed, supervised or risk assessed, or to a change in the treatment intervention 
that they receive’: Theresa A Gannon, Jane Wood, Afroditi Pina, Eduardo Vasquez and Iain Fraser 
‘The evaluation of the mandatory polygraph pilot’ Ministry of Justice Research Series 14/12, July 
2012. 
17 Gannon et al. (n. 16), para 3.3. 
18 Ibid, para 2.3. 
19 Lord Wallace of Saltaire HL Deb 12 June 2007, vol. 692, col 1583- 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2007-06-
12/debates/07061259000002/OffenderManagementBill?highlight=polygraph#contribution-
07061268000031 (last accessed: 15/07/2020). 
20 NOMS PSI 12/2015, para 1.25. 
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perpetrators, proposes a national scheme of mandatory polygraph testing. The 
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill proposes the immediate imposition of the 
option of a polygraph condition for relevant terrorism offenders and, in addition, 
proposes that the polygraph test be used to assess ‘whether any variation of the 
specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or 
restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity’ (clause 41 of the 
Bill). This suggests that the polygraph’s assessment of truthfulness or deceptiveness 
of the individual subject to the TPIM (in respect of questions related to the other 
measures imposed) will be used to determine whether measures should be 
continued, expanded or discontinued. 
Rules, Policies and Practices Governing the Use of the Polygraph by Police and 
Probation Services 
In addition to the legislative framework mentioned above, polygraph testing in the 
probation context is subject to a number of linked Prison Service Instructions (PSIs), 
setting out guidance on the imposition of polygraph licence conditions.21  In respect 
of police use of polygraphs, a 2014 ACPO (now National Police Chiefs’ Council) 
statement on polygraphs in investigations strongly discourages its use, drawing 
attention to potential adverse consequences for the investigative interview, the wider 
investigation and the trial process.22 
The statement provides that if a polygraph has been used, it must be revealed to the 
Crown Prosecution Service, and therefore it will likely be disclosed to the defence. It 
sets out three particular sets of circumstances where the investigation could be 
tarnished: 
i) Where someone has been eliminated from the investigation directly because of the 
use of a polygraph or on the basis of lines of enquiry following a polygraph test. It 
could be argued that the whole enquiry was flawed because too much reliance was 
placed on an invalid technique;  
ii) If a suspect is implicated from polygraphic evidence, it could be argued that the 
investigation followed lines of enquiry that were heavily influenced by ‘confirmation 
bias’ based on a flawed technology; 
iii) If a victim of a crime is seen to be deceptive because of a polygraph, then it would 
be a mistake merely to drop those enquiries. 
The statement concludes by stating, ‘[t]here are no typical cues to deceit, either 
through non-verbal behaviour, verbal behaviour, or physiology that can be used 
within the UK criminal justice system to accurately and consistently discriminate 
between lies and truth.’  
However, use of the polygraph is only discouraged, as forces remain operationally 
independent. The statement continues, ‘[i]t is a matter for individual Forces to decide 
which methods they use in areas of police business that fall outside the investigative 
 
21 In particular see NOMS PSI 36/2014 and 12/2015. 
22 The document is online available, see http://library.college.police.uk/docs/APPREF/National-
Policing-Position-Statement-use-of-Polygraph-May-2014.pdf (last accessed on 01/09/2020). 
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context or security screening, provided that the information derived from their use 
does not form part of the evidential chain.’ 
Furthermore, our FOI research has uncovered considerable inconsistencies within 
UK police forces in respect of transparency around polygraph use. Of the 46 police 
forces which replied (94% response rate), 37 used a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ 
response (justified on the basis of a number of different grounds). 5 forces denied 
the use of polygraphs, without any further NCND caveat. These responses were 
commonly quick and to the point, stating that they do not, have never, and do not 
intend to, use polygraph testing in investigations.23 This reflects the differences 
between the Scottish and English jurisdictions, with the Scottish Government 
stressing that they remain ‘unconvinced’ by the polygraph’s efficacy.24 Contrary to 
Lord Lloyd’s view, the polygraph is – at least on an empirical level – perhaps not very 
Scottish rather than not very English! 
Some forces stated (after requests for internal review) that they do not use 
polygraphs in an ‘overt’ capacity – the meaning of ‘overt’ use, or indeed covert use, 
was not explained. Only 3 responses (one of which came from the Ministry of Justice 
on behalf of HMPPS) drew attention to the 2014 ACPO statement. We cannot 
therefore rule out the possibility that the polygraph is currently being used in 
investigatory work or in some covert context. It should be noted that a pilot of the 
polygraph with individuals suspected of committing an online sexual offence was 
carried out between 2017-19.25  Our FOI research also highlighted the use by one 
police force of a polygraph test as a bail condition connected to a community 
sentence, and this is discussed in the human rights section below. 
Scrutinising the Arguments of the Polygraph Proponents 
The utility argument  
According to the Parliamentary Under Secretary for State for the Home Department, 
the use of the polygraph is simply seeking ‘to prompt new disclosures that might 
otherwise not happen, or to elicit an indication that might suggest that further 
investigation by the relevant authority should be undertaken. The purpose of using 
polygraphs is nothing more nor less than to achieve those very limited objectives.’26 
This has been a familiar refrain since the three year assessment of voluntary 
polygraph assessment which influenced the passing of the 2007 Act: that testing 
increased the number of ‘clinically relevant disclosures’ compared to no testing.27 
The evaluation of the mandatory testing pilot pursuant to the 2007 Act concluded 
 
23 Gwent Police; Merseyside Police; Police Scotland; The Port of Dover Police and Wiltshire Police. 
24 Joanna Cherry MP comments on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, House of Commons 
Hansard, Volume 678, Column 2055, 21 July 2020 https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-07-
21/debates/9161FFEE-DBE1-4722-B048-649F2FC4586B/Counter-TerrorismAndSentencingBill. 
25 Jane L. Wood, Emma Alleyne, Caoilte O Ciardha and Theresa A Gannon, ‘Polygraph Testing by 
Police to Manage Individuals Convicted or Suspected of Sexual Offending’; online available: 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/school-of-psychology/downloads/kent_polygraph_report.pdf (last accessed: 
01/09/2020). 
26 Chris Philip, House of Commons Hansard, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Seventh sitting), 
Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2020, Column 203. 
27 Don Grubin (2010). A trial of voluntary polygraphy testing in 10 English probation areas. Sexual 
Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 22(3):266-278. DOI: 10.1177/1079063210369012. 
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that the number of clinically significant disclosures made by offenders in the 
polygraph-tested group was higher than that made by offenders in the comparison 
group. Following such disclosures, a higher proportion of offender managers in the 
polygraph group took action to increase preventative supervision measures, 
including recall to prison.28 There is also a strong suggestion from the pilot 
evaluation that use of the polygraph changes the nature of the supervision, 
emphasising compliance with licence conditions, rather than offender needs or 
intentions.29 As Grubin comments, ‘[y]ou cannot use polygraph testing as a means of 
testing intentions. The polygraph is looking specifically at behaviours.’30 
The utility claimed for the polygraph is not limited to prompting disclosures, however. 
Despite the acknowledged invalidity of the ‘lie detector’ description, the polygraph 
test is still touted as being able to detect truthfulness or deception, and therefore to 
guide the decision of the offender manager as to whether or not to trust the 
offender’s statements. The evaluation of the pilot reported that offender managers 
found the polygraph ‘useful’ in giving them ‘confidence’ that the manager was 
complying with his licence conditions.31  If a polygraph indicated deception, further 
challenges would follow, whereas if the results showed no deception, ‘it reassured 
them of the offender’s honesty.’32  This is reflected in guidance for offender 
managers which describes the polygraph as a device which measures physiological 
responses, changes in which ‘are thought to indicate whether the subject is lying’.33  
This guidance states that ‘no deception indicated’ results may allow ‘an adjustment 
downwards of the offender’s risk of serious harm’.34  Evidence to the recent Counter-
Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee continued the message that the ‘truthful 
test’ with no disclosures can provide ‘reassurance’.35 
This utilitarian approach to the polygraph is all too familiar in the United States, 
where the polygraph has been in widespread use to assess evidence and in 
employee screening since the 1960s: ‘Confessions, admissions […] and additional 
information of investigative value gained through […] testing come about due to the 
utility of the polygraph and the determination of the examiner, irrespective of the 
instrument’s reliability or validity.’36 The 2012 evaluation of the English pilot follows 
this utilitarian model by limiting its aims to evaluation of the polygraph on disclosures 
and offender management practices, thus allowing any increase in disclosures to be 
evaluated as a ‘success’. We now face a situation where there ‘are effectively two 
systems running in parallel: one in relation to criminal court proceedings, in which 
expert testimony is admitted only if based upon a scientifically valid foundation 
 
28 Gannon et al. (n. 16),, p. ii. 
29 Gannon et al. (n. 16), para 4.2. 
30 Don Grubin, Public Bill Committee, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Second sitting) 25 June 
2020. 
31 Gannon et al. (n. 16),para 3.5. 
32 Gannon et al. (n. 16), para 4.2. 
33 National Offender Management Service, Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for Imposing Licence 
Conditions for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders, PSI36/2014, para 1.4. 
34 National Offender Management Service, Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for Imposing Licence 
Conditions for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders, PSI36/2014, Appendix 1, para 2.8.7. 
35 Don Grubin, Public Bill Committee, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Second sitting) 25 June 
2020. 
36 Warner, William J. 2005. “Polygraph Testing: A Utilitarian Tool.” FBI L. Enforcement Bull 74: 10. 
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relevant to the issue at hand, and one which runs parallel to the court system without 
such constraints, based on realist and utilitarian principles.’37 
Proponents would argue that the system ‘works’ if the threat of the polygraph – 
despite its lack of scientific validity - elicits additional disclosures. Disclosures, 
however, are not an end in themselves. We face a paradigm shift towards an 
actuarial approach catalysed by the polygraph38 where the threat of the polygraph to 
elicit disclosures has become the aim. The purpose of the supervision of offenders 
under licence is however stated to be a) protection of the public b) the prevention of 
re-offending and c) securing the successful re-integration of the prisoner into the 
community.39 Evaluations to date have been extremely limited in their remit and have 
not addressed the validity of the polygraph and its overall impact of the polygraph on 
supervision objectives and on human rights principles. 
Note that if deception is indicated (despite the risk of false positives) and the 
offender is not ‘forthcoming in offering any explanation’, then a ‘sound guiding 
principle’ is to ‘address the issue “head on” with the offender and try to verify it’.40 
The polygraph is thus revealed as an interrogation technique (as discussed further 
below), designed to extract disclosures by the threat of a ‘failed result’ and the 
promise of ‘positive feedback’ for a ‘passed’ test.41 Furthermore, and perhaps even 
more concerningly, the consequences of false negatives in respect of ‘no deception 
indicated’ results are not addressed and instead, such a result is described as a 
measure of truthfulness. Thus, the result of a pseudoscientific method effectively 
becomes the decision, usurping the role of the authorised legal official qua legitimate 
(human) decision-maker. 
In the context of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), the 
proposed inclusion of a polygraph condition creates new and potentially unforeseen 
risks. This is due to the proposal that the polygraph test be used to assess ‘whether 
any variation of the specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with 
preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.’42 
This suggests that the polygraph's assessment of truthfulness or deceptiveness of 
the individual subject to the TPIM (in respect of questions related to the other 
measures imposed) will be used to determine whether measures should be 
continued, expanded or discontinued. This appears to us to be highly dangerous and 
inappropriate (and of course would not be admissible in criminal proceedings). This 
provision seems to bring with it an implicit assumption that the polygraph can 
determine truthfulness or otherwise, and an abdication of the authorised legal 
officials’ decision-making prerogative to the polygraph, running contrary to the 
 
37 Marion Oswald (2020) Technologies in the twilight zone: early lie detectors, machine learning and 
reformist legal realism, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 34:2, 214-231, DOI: 
10.1080/13600869.2020.1733758. 
38 See Mireille Hildebrandt on technological affordances in ‘Proactive Forensic Profiling: Proactive 
Criminalization?’ in R Antony Duff and others (eds), The boundaries of the criminal law (OUP, 2010), 
121. 
39 s.250(8) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
40 National Offender Management Service, Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for Imposing Licence 
Conditions for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders, PSI36/2014, Appendix 1, para 2.8.5.  
41 PEI (n. 40),  Appendix 1, para 2.8.7. 
42 Clause 41, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020-21. 
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Secretary of State’s duties under ss 3(3) & (4) of the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011. 
It is understandable that those public officials faced with difficult decisions that could 
have life-threatening consequences will tend to look favourably at a system that 
purports to offer certainty, comfort and reassurance. As Risinger et al. put it pithily 
(on a similar occasion, i.e. handwriting identification ‘expertise’), this is one of the 
cases where the ‘search for truth’ model of our procedural system cannot account for 
many phenomena in the real world of criminal justice. For the Government finds itself 
under the stress of ‘having to wrestle with important types of facts’, indeed with risks 
threatening the stability of our modern way of life, i.e. terrorism, and invites the 
‘creation of a proxy for rational knowledge, a form with the appearance of evidence 
but no rational content’. Such a type of evidence is the polygraph output which the 
system uses in a ‘ritual exorcism of an ignorance’ whose presence in the context of 
terrorism seems unbearable.43 The lack of attention paid to the validity of the 
polygraph, however, in favour of a focus on its limited ‘usefulness’, means that we 
instead end up with a system that produces more uncertainty, as officials come to 
rely on a system that communicates certainty, but is based on invalid methods and 
thus significant risk of false results. 
Corroboration-rule argument 
Among others the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has expressed the 
view that polygraphs should be seen as an additional information source that is 
sensible to use.44 On the face of it, this might appear to be a common-sense and 
straightforward position. Delve a little further, however, and the position reveals itself 
as to be anything but straightforward. 
In view of the use immunity enshrined in s.30 2007 Act and the instructions for 
conducting a polygraph test (PEI) one would feel inclined to assign to the polygraph 
test a low and non-conclusive probative weight compared to information gained 
during the interview. More specifically, the PEI state that ‘if the polygraph 
examination indicated that the released person was potentially failing to tell the truth 
this would not, in itself, be a breach of the licence condition’.45 
 
This has prompted public officials to stress that a DI alone cannot trigger legal 
effects. As the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office and 
Ministry of Justice Chris Philp MP put it in the House of Commons: 
‘If somebody fails one of these polygraph tests on licence, further investigatory work 
is done by the police or the probation service. It triggers further work, which will then 
produce a conclusion one way or the other. It does not produce a binding result, but 
it serves as a trigger.’46 
 
43 D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons 
of Handwriting Identification “Expertise”, in: 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1989), pp. 731-739–51 (1989). 
44 Transcript of the first sitting of the House of Commons Public Bill Committee on the Counter-
Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21, 25 June 2020. 
45 PEI para 2.9.2. 
46 House of Commons. Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, 2nd Reading – 09 June 2020, vol 677, 
online available: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-06-09/debates/F2B7F77A-82C4-4232-
8901-C426BBFD1BEC/Counter-TerrorismAndSentencingBill (last accessed: 01/09/2020). 
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It seems thus that the legal order goes one step further than granting use immunity 
in criminal proceedings and, additionally, imposes corroboration requirements for this 
type of evidence in the probation context: According to the PEI an uncorroborated DI 
cannot warrant a finding of breach of any licence condition or any other legally 
relevant behaviour. The problem is however that the PEI try to make a virtue out of 
necessity for two interrelated reasons: 
 
First, a DI is not based on reliable methodology. It does not indicate anything insofar 
as it cannot differentiate between competing hypotheses. Simply put, there is no 
identifiable link between physiological reactions and psychological concepts / 
truthfulness or deception. As every blue-ribbon committee on (the validity of) the 
polygraph test confirms, the ‘stress response’ to be measured can be triggered by a 
host of factors. There is simply no unique physiological indicator that reflects a single 
underlying process, let alone deception.47 This is obviously a thorn in the flesh of the 
polygraph insofar, as the epistemological presupposition that ‘deception and 
truthfulness reliably elicit different psychological states across examinees’48 and in 
particular that ‘the polygraph is a device that measures certain physiological 
responses […] which are thought to indicate whether the subject is lying’49 is of 
pivotal importance for the very existence of the polygraph. 
 
Secondly, and regardless of the invalid underlying methodology, a DI is – we cannot 
stress this enough – probabilistic in nature. As such it does not refer to a specific 
individual or a specific statement. It cannot prompt any action in the same way that 
the information that ‘97 per cent of Italian citizens are catholic’ does not tell us 
whether L., an Italian citizen, is catholic. As the statistician David Lucy put it pithily, it 
is simply ‘ridiculous’ to assign base rates to individual cases.50 The problem, 
however, is again much deeper than our inability to use statistical output as a 
warrant for decisions. For the polygraph ‘test’ does not generate any scientific data 
insofar as an interview is not a replicable process.51 In the penal system there is no 
universe of John Lennon shootings in which we can count how many times he was 
shot by M.D. Chapman and the number of times that someone else was the culprit. 
As Fulford LJ put it: ‘no two trials are the same, and the type, quantity and quality of 
the evidence differs greatly between cases.’52 What is more, early on in the history of 
the polygraph it became clear that ‘wide divergence’ in the structure of the respective 
interview is inevitable due to the ‘widely varying types of questions, examiners, and 
examinees’.53 The complex interaction between the examiner and the examinee 
show that lack of standardisation signals a feature, not a bug in the system. The 
polygraph output or indeed any empirical research on this subject, is thus deprived of 
any generality. Polygraph operators do not, indeed cannot follow any standard 
 
47 See e.g. NRC-Report (Fn. 6), p. 78; see also British Psychological Society (2004) A Review of the 
Current Scientific Status and Fields of Application of Polygraphic Deception Detection, Final Report 
from the BPS Working Party Leicester, p. 29. 
48 NRC-Report (Fn. 6), p. 65. 
49 See e.g. National Offender Management Service (U.K.), Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for 
Imposing Licence Conditions for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders, para 1.4 
(https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psi-2014/psi-36-2014-polygraph-
examinations.pdf, last accessed 07/06/2020). 
50 D. Lucy, Introduction to Statistics for Forensic Scientists (Wiley, 2005), p. 5. 
51 CPD 2015 V 19A.6.(c). 
52 R v PR [2019] EWCA Crim 1225; [2019] 2 Cr App R 22, at [65]. 
53 OTA-Report (Fn. 6), p. 11. 
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procedure. As the U.K. Ministry of Justice/Probation Service informed us: ‘there are 
no set questions that come with this [polygraph] test. Each test is created and based 
on the specific licence conditions of the individual’ – unsurprisingly. What is more, 
several police forces replying to our FOI requests noted that each test is bespoke to 
the individual, which is equally unsurprising in view of the complex nature of 
historical events and human conversation.54 
 
Research on the accuracy of polygraph tests utilise mock interviews, which is an 
experiment with the wrong type of guinea pigs insofar55 as the forensic context is 
wildly dissimilar than the controlled environment in the laboratory. Real people 
involved in the criminal justice system have real stakes, complex motivations and 
recollections of events. Empirical research in that area suffers from a lack of realism 
which is a precondition of validity. The reason for that is what empirical researchers 
coin the ‘base rate problem’. As Gudjonsson explains, ‘[a]t the most basic level we 
do not know the proportion of suspects interrogated at police stations who are 
genuinely guilty of the offence of which they are accused. This makes it impossible 
to estimate the frequency with which false confessions occur’.56 
 
Regarding the polygraph as ‘information gain’57 is at its best inaccurate. It is, as we 
will show below, an interrogation tool, another Trojan horse in which the extraction 
imperative is secreted under the veil of technological progress. Its purpose and sole 
potential are not to detect truth (the polygraph cannot detect anything), but to enable 
interviewers to extract confessions statements (CSD). 
 
The non-oppression argument 
As outlined above, para 2.9.2. PEI imposes only a quasi-corroboration requirement. 
For a DI qua statistical in nature cannot trigger any legal effect, i.e. any decision 
about a specific individual. The full scale of the problem becomes visible as soon as 
we broaden our view and examine the non-oppression argument. 
 
According to the PEI (para 2.9.3) ‘if the offender admits to, or discloses about, 
behaviour that would constitute a breach either before taking the polygraph test, or 
afterwards when “explaining” a failed test result, enforcement proceedings may 
follow’. Again, the devil lies in the details. 
 
First, released offenders are forced to undergo polygraph sessions insofar, as ‘failure 
to attend or comply with the polygraph session as instructed would constitute a 
breach of the licence condition’.58 The PEI sanction thus non-attendance of a 
pseudo-scientific interview ritual whose output would either way be declared 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Released offenders are forced to subject 
themselves to unreliable procedures. Once there, the offender must undergo a test 
 
54 Data from FOI requests can be made available upon request. 
55 See already C.D. Lee, The Instrumental Detection of Deception (Springfield: Illinois, 1952), p. 25. 
56 Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions (Wiley: Chichester, 2003), 
p. 173. 
57 See e.g. Donald Grubin’s Oral Evidence in Parliament. Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 
(Second sitting) - 25 June 2020 (Column 53), online available: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-06-25/debates/480977f0-facf-4237-8a40-
4a5fc5a552c9/details (last accessed: 02/09/2020). 
58 PEI, Appendix 1, para 2.94. 
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which can of course easily be tricked,59 and which cannot detect any unique 
physiological indication of untruthfulness. 
 
Secondly, according to para 2.7.4 PEI, an offender who has failed the test (DI) ‘will 
be given the opportunity to explain the test result in the post-test phase of the 
examination’. This is ‘another opportunity’, the PEI stress, to ‘disclose information’. 
Repetitive use of the term ‘opportunity’, as evidenced above, distracts us from the 
fact that the polygraph-test is calibrated towards extracting confession statements by 
instilling fear of detection. For interrogative suggestibility, as research clearly shows, 
appears to be significantly mediated by anxiety processes.60 Remember also that a 
polygraph test is –unlike a routine visit to the GP— a ‘fairly lengthy process’ which 
typically lasts ‘two or three hours’.61 The obligation of the interviewee to provide an 
explanation for the DI is highly informative, for the simple reason that the PEI do not 
regard –even from within the flawed logic of the polygraph— the very possibility of a 
false-alarm as relevant. The offender must provide an explanation for an indication 
which, let us repeat, can, on the polygraph’s own terms, be a false positive. What is 
more, if deception is indicated and the offender is not ‘forthcoming in offering any 
explanation’, then a ‘sound guiding principle’, according to the PEI, is to ‘address the 
issue “head on” with the offender and try to verify it’.62 But ‘challenging the 
interviewee head on’ is yet another way to gain leverage based on malleable 
pseudo-scientific output. This is, we think, the exact point where the bogus-pipeline 
effect kicks in. Because the subject operates on the wrongful basis that the 
polygraph test a) works independently and b) will reflect their true attitude, and 
because c) they do not wish (no one does) to be second-guessed by the machine, 
they will feel pressured to disclose adverse statements.63 This suffices also to 
explain why the so called stimulation test is considered to be an ‘indispensable’64 
part of the polygraph interview.65 
 
The polygraph test relies thus on a logical fallacy, i.e. on assuming what we need to 
prove. We conclude that every polygraph operator faces an unpalatable dilemma: 
Either to inform the subject that the polygraph test lacks scientific validity or to deploy 
a psychological procedure (stim test) based on false statements in order to extract a 
confession. The field of polygraphy choose persistently the latter – among other 
things through demonstrably false empirical claims. Such is the claim that there is a 
‘unique pattern of response for specific emotional states’.66 
 
 
59 See NRC-Report, Polygraph (n. 6), p. 139-141. 
60 Gudjonsson, Psychology (n. 56), p. 148. 
61 See Don Grubin’s witness statement in: Parliamentary Debates - House of Commons Official 
Report General Committees - Public Bill Committee - Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill - First 
Sitting Thursday 25 June 2020 (Morning). Online available: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmpublic/CounterTerrorism/PBC129_Counter-
Terrorism_1st-4th_Combined_30_06_2020.pdf (last accessed: 02/07/2020). 
62 PEI, Appendix 1 para 2.8.5. 
63 E.E, Jones / H. Sigall, The bogus pipeline: A new paradigm for measuring affect and attitude, in: 
76(5) Psychological Bulletin (1971), pp. 349–364. 
64 OTA-Report (Fn. 6), p. 12. 
65 According to s5(3) of the Polygraph Rules 2009: “A polygraph session must include a pre-test 
interview, one or more polygraph examinations and a post-test interview.” 
66 See e.g. Stanley Abrams, The Utilization and Effectiveness of the Stimulation Test, in: 7 Polygraph 
(1978), pp. 178-181 (178-9). 
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There are deep psychological reasons for that approach. As the PEI document 
openly admits (para 2.8.5) ‘Offender Managers sometimes struggle to decide on 
what to do, if the test result was “deception indicated”, if the offender was not 
forthcoming in offering any explanation’. But herein lies the problem. As Beccaria 
explained already in the 18th century, it is not the actual events of the alleged crime 
that are unravelled before the eyes of the oppressive investigator but the strength ‘of 
the will of the accused’. For the ‘very means employed to distinguish the innocent 
from the guilty’ will, Beccaria noted, make the difference between them disappear, so 
that we, ultimately, get information about ‘the force of the muscles and the sensibility 
of the nerves’ of the accused person rather than a truth-conducive statement.67 
 
In the polygraph context, we are not dealing of course with strictly physical pain, but 
with psychological pressure. We are not operating on the basis of the (false) 
assumption that ‘God will give the defendant the strength to endure’; the explicit 
assumption though that the device will detect untruthful statements is playing the 
exact same role. We think, therefore, that the difference between torture and the 
polygraph is a matter of degree, not category.68 Remember also that the main 
function of the stimulation test is to instil fear of detection. In a similar way to torture, 
suggestibility is not a reliable or legitimate way of conducting an interview as it 
generates confession statements while, at the same time, it inflates their probative 
force. So, yes, offenders are, technically, not recalled on the basis of a failed 
polygraph test. But polygraph examiners and probation officers can, first, utilise a 
‘failed’ test (whatever this means) using it as leverage to extract information from 
mostly vulnerable and under psychological pressure individuals. Secondly, they can 
inform the police about the very fact of a ‘failed test’ which, let us repeat, is not 
based on valid methodology. The police then will use this ‘failed test’ to issue a 
search warrant on the basis of non-reasonable grounds and secure further evidence. 
 
Furthermore, as regards the legal semantics of the term oppression, we should not 
forget that the remit of oppression which is partially defined in s.76(8) of PACE,69 
also includes deception. For example, it was held in Mason that a lie told by the 
police –that the defendant’s fingerprints had been found on an article used in the 
offence— should have resulted in exclusion of his confession under s.78 of PACE. 
The trial judge had failed to take into account the deception practiced not only on the 
defendant which, as the Court of Appeal stressed, ‘is bad enough’, but also upon the 
latter’s solicitor. Had the trial judge included the deceit practiced upon the appellant 
and his solicitor in his consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeal notes, then 
they ‘have not the slightest doubt that he would have been driven to an opposite 
conclusion, namely, that the confession be ruled out and the jury not permitted 
therefore to hear of it’. ‘Hoodwinking’ the defendant through deception, the Court of 
Appeal noted, ‘was a most reprehensible thing to do’.70 Heron71 is another case 
which dealt with coercive tactics employed by the police. It was held that the use of 
deliberate deception on a suspect may contribute to a finding of oppression. The 
court judge excluded the defendant’s confession on the grounds both of verballing 
 
67 C Beccaria, An Essay on Crime and Punishment, ch. XVI. 
68 See K.N. Kotsoglou, Über die ‚Verständigung‘ im Strafverfahren als Aussageerpressung. In: 12 ZIS 
(2015), pp. 175–199. 
69 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 c.60. 
70 Mason [1987] 3 All E.R. 481. 
71 R. v Heron, The Times, 22 November, 1993. 
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during the interview and the lies told to the latter that allegedly two witnesses had 
identified the latter as being at the spot where the murdered girl was last seen alive. 
It is highly doubtful whether in similar circumstances a direction to the jury about the 
need for special would remedy the trial judge’s failure to exclude the confession 
under ss.76(2) and 78 of PACE.72 
 
One might argue that the caselaw outlined above is irrelevant insofar, as it does not 
apply to the probation context. It is contained, one might think, in the context of the 
criminal process and its law of evidence. This is, as we will show below, a short-
sighted view which seriously neglects the unity of the legal order and its underlying 
principles such as rationality and accountability, salient across different contexts. 
 
The containment argument 
The next argument that proponents of the polygraph bring forward is what we will 
dub the containment-argument. It states that concerns around the use of the 
polygraph from a criminal evidence perspective are not applicable to use in 
probation, investigative or TPIMs contexts. There are two main problems with this 
view. 
 
a) Reasonable Grounds? The use of the polygraph does not take place in a 
jurisprudential black hole. The polygraph’s outcome can, and often does lead to 
further criminal investigations. Let us take a thorough look at one of the examples 
that are regarded as typical scenarios and with which the UK Government advertises 
the use of the polygraph in HPPS: 
 
‘J is a 47year old sexual offender […] J was subject to mandatory polygraph testing 
as part of his release following a nine-year custodial sentence. During the polygraph 
examination he denied any contact with children under the age of 18 years. The test 
revealed he was attempting to be deceptive. The test was run a second time and still 
produced a deceptive result. The polygraph examiner contacted the offender 
manager who immediately contacted the police. The police were waiting for the 
offender when he returned to his property and found three young boys and another 
adult in the house. J was immediately recalled to custody. The police were able to 
make further investigations’.73 
 
The scenario –whether representative or not— raises serious questions as regards 
the lawful character of police conduct. First, no polygraph results could ever ‘reveal’ 
that the interviewee is ‘attempting to be deceptive’. No set of physiological data can 
be reliably associated to specific psychological concepts. Let us stress once again 
that the key message in scientific literature is that there is simply no unique 
physiological correlate that reflects deception. The Government’s scenario is 
therefore misleading. Secondly, the aforementioned scenario exemplifies that the 
Government pays lip service to the use immunity enshrined in s.30(1) 2007 Act. For 
the offender manager can inform the police about the DI –remember that there are 
no clear rules as to what counts as DI. The police will thereupon investigate and 
secure new (admissible) evidence. In absence of a strict exclusionary rule for the 
 
72 R v. Moss (1990) 91 Cr.App.R. 371. 
73 Mandatory Polygraph Tests. Counter Terrorism Bill. Online available: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/87
2087/ct-factsheet.pdf (last accessed: 02/07/2020). 
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fruit of the poisonous tree police forces seem willing to take their chances with the 
‘fruit’ of the polygraph. The problem, however, is that although investigations and 
new evidence might be able to bypass the exclusionary rules enshrined in ss.76 and 
78 PACE 1984, they cannot distract us from the main issue at this juncture. Police 
conduct hinges on the existence of reasonable grounds for suspecting that an 
offence may have been committed (PACE Code B, para 2.5 and 3.1). Polygraph 
evidence is neither based on reliable methodology nor is it individualised due to its 
probabilistic nature. It is thus a contradiction in terms to base a suspicion for a crime 
on the output of a device which lacks validity and as a result is inadmissible in 
criminal courts across the globe. The legitimacy of police conduct fails on the 
reasonableness-requirement salient in PACE, indeed the legal order as a whole. 
 
b) Integrity:  Obviously, the structural features and normative objectives in the 
probation context are constituted in a much different way than the set of principles 
and rules permeating the criminal process. We cannot expect, indeed desire, the 
same level of procedural and evidential guarantees across the penal system. 
Differing standards of proof, stratified procedural guarantees and diverging 
regulatory thickness are a necessary expression of differences between the various 
parts of the legal system. However, a core minimum should be preserved. By 
deploying interview rituals masqueraded as technological solutions which on their 
own terms lack scientific validity, we jeopardise not just the rationality of a legal 
order, but, most importantly, some of its structural features: its normative cohesion, 
stability, and integrity. From the premise that integrity is the surface feature of a set 
of institutional practices and procedures permeated by the same core values, or at 
least values which are not directly contradicting each other, we can conclude that the 
use of unreliable methods in allegedly siloed parts of the criminal justice system 
fragments the unity of law. What is more, the abovementioned interview rituals are 
even among themselves uncoordinated and of varying professional standards. As 
the U.K. Ministry of Justice/Probation Service put it: ‘there are no set questions that 
come with this [polygraph] test. Each test is created and based on the specific 
licence conditions of the individual.’74 
 
It is highly problematic that the decision-making process for recalling the released 
offender’s licence is not nested in the evidential and procedural framework of 
guarantees salient in the penal system especially vis-à-vis reliability, prohibition of 
verballing, and proper assessment of confession statements. This is particularly 
worrying from the point of view of the integrity of the criminal justice system insofar,75 
as we can only tolerate the use of deception and psychological manipulation for the 
extraction of confessions at the price of using double inferential standards. Making 
false representations about the validity of the device especially vis-à-vis its 
diagnostic potential in order to instil fear and elicit semi-voluntary confessions, is 
deeply alarming not only vertically, i.e. with regard to the lack of validity of the 
procedure, but also horizontally, i.e. in view of the operational tensions within the 
penal system. As Dixon explains: ‘On a holistic view, integrity implies normative 
coherence rather than fragmentation or irreconcilable conflicts in fundamental 
 
74 Response from Ministry to Justice - 18 March 2020. 
75 Term is used in R v C [2014] EWCA Crim 343, at [6] and [9]; R v Clayton [2014] EWCA Crim 1030 
at [13]. 
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commitments.’76 Such a commitment is the requirement to ground decisions on 
validated, reliable evidence. Evidence used in the probation context must be reliable 
not because Dlugosz has settled the legal issues in the criminal process, but 
because of the deeper jurisprudential principles salient in the penal system which in 
turn shaped Dlugosz. The relation therefore between the probation context and 
criminal process is epiphenomenal. Both contexts derive their evidential and 
inferential standards from core jurisprudential principles (systemic features) such as 
rationality, normative integrity and accountability. 
 
After all, arbitrariness is not a threat for the rationality of the criminal verdict only. 
Avoidance of arbitrariness lies at the heart of human rights (Article 5, Article. 8) 
whose remit includes undoubtedly the probation context. As the Strasburg Court in 
its Grand Chamber decisions stated, the law must indicate the scope of any such 
discretion and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual 
adequate protection against arbitrary interference.77 It constitutes an irreconcilable 
contradiction to exclude unreliable evidence from the criminal process when at the 
same time these can be used to revoke a released offender’s licence –whether the 
polygraph evidence is the sole evidential basis of the decision or not. The generation 
and use of disclosures extracted with the use of polygraph exemplifies that 
fundamental values and principles of the criminal process are not integrated 
throughout the set of practices within the context of probation. Whereas confession 
evidence can be ruled (in-)admissible during a voir dire, an adverse statement during 
the polygraph-test may trigger enforcement proceedings, i.e. revoke the offender’s 
licence and send him back to prison without any of the procedural and evidential 
guarantees of the interview processes set out in PACE and its codes of practice: that 
a person must be cautioned before being questioned about an alleged offence; that 
they must be informed of their legal rights; more specifically: that they are entitled to 
free legal advice; that they have the right not to incriminate themselves. This looks 
however more like a police state than a Rechtsstaat. As Lord Sumption put it in a 
similar context pithily: ‘This is what a police state is like: It’s a state in which the 
Government can issue orders or express preferences with no legal authority and the 
police will enforce ministers’ wishes.’78 
 
This disparity catalyses a disintegration process which threatens to break the 
criminal justice system to its component parts. For it will be increasingly difficult –
especially now that other areas of law (domestic abuse, counter-terrorism) are 
queuing up to deploy the polygraph— to preserve one of the main features of law: its 
‘characteristic unity and continuity’.79 The dissociation of common standards of 
validity through probation practice brings about the Noah effect which has become a 
shorthand term in modern science for discontinuity and disruption. The criminal 
justice system cannot thus integrate diametrically opposing standards of legal 
validity. The use of the polygraph proves thus to be more significant than its 
restricted use: It mestasises. It turns out to open a disconcerting gap between 
 
76 See David Dixon, Integrity, Interrogation and Criminal Injustice, in: J. Hunter/P. Roberts/ S.N.M 
Young/David Dixon (eds.), The Integrity of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016), especially, pp. 75-98 (79). 
77 Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], Application no. 47143/06 - 4 December 2015, §§ 229-230; S. and 
Marper v. The United Kingdom [GC] (Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04). 
78 Lord Sumption, Interview on Radio 4 (30 March 2020). 
79 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 116. 
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procedural rights and probation rights, between the criminal process and a probation 
system which appears to be by design ‘irredeemably flawed’.80 
The expertise argument  
During evidence presented to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill 
Committee, it was asserted that: 
‘the people who administer the polygraph tests are highly trained. The regulations 
that we already use in relation to sex offenders, and that are likely to form the basis 
of the regulations here, require high levels of training and quality assurance for those 
who administer the tests. They are expert people who are selected and trained very 
carefully, and they use their powers and authority in a carefully managed and 
circumspect manner.’81 
There is however, little or no transparent and independent data to support this 
assertion. The Polygraph Rules 2009 require polygraph operators to have completed 
training accredited by the American Polygraph Association (APA), and carried out a 
minimum of 20 post-conviction sex offender testing polygraph examinations under 
the supervision of an APA examiner.82 Although the Rules require review of sessions 
by a ‘polygraph supervisor’, this person is required to have completed the same APA 
training and to review the techniques of the operator against the ‘standards’ of the 
American Polygraph Association.83 
But what is really this rather opaque Association and what are the implications of its 
‘standards’ and training becoming part of the polygraph regime in England and 
Wales? According to its website, the APA describes itself as the ‘leading 
professional polygraph organization in the world’ purporting to govern its members 
by a number of US focused codes and standards.84 Despite this veneer of 
objectivity, such codes and standards have no legal or regulatory status in the UK, 
and are the equivalent of the polygraph industry marking its own homework. 
Notwithstanding that polygraph operators may be public servants, in no way can the 
insertion of APA processes into the UK criminal justice system be described as 
providing ‘quality assurance’ or independent oversight or management, especially 
when those benefiting commercially from the training of operators are responsible for 
setting the standards and influencing legal developments.  As Synnott, Dietzel & 
Ioannou comment, ‘The polygraph industry, by virtue of being an industry, has an 
inherent interest in the promotion of the polygraph, but is not dependent upon the 
support of the scientific community, which arguably impedes its interest in scientific 
advancement and validation.’85  
 
80 ΗΜ Inspectorate of Probation, Report of the Chief Inspector of Probation (March 2019), p. 20. 
81 n 26. 
82 UKSI 2009 No. 619, Rule 3. 
83 UKSI 2009 No. 619, Schedule 1. 
84 https://apoa.memberclicks.net/. 
85 John Synnott, David Dietzel & Maria Ioannou (2015) A review of the polygraph: history, 
methodology and current status, Crime Psychology Review, 1:1, pp. 59-83, DOI: 
10.1080/23744006.2015.1060080. 
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Historically, we have seen proponents of the polygraph attempting to change rules of 
evidence to admit polygraph testimony ‘on the basis of arguments around fairness, 
human unreliability and scientific progress […] They published articles in legal and 
criminology academic journals, with press reports of the machine as ‘witness’, or 
returning verdicts of innocence or guilt, contributing to their cause.’86  This overlap 
between academia, industry and the public sector continues today, justifying a high 
degree of scepticism and scrutiny of any claims around polygraph use and accuracy. 
Most police forces were unwilling to provide detailed answers to our FOI request 
(and this self-similar lack of transparency is of itself of considerable concern, 
impacting as it does on the public’s ability to understand and scrutinise the use of the 
polygraph).  There were a few commendable exceptions however, with one force87 
providing the following information: 
a) There are no specific questions asked in the polygraph test as the questions are 
case specific for each person. 
b) The polygraph test operators attend a Behavioural Measures UK (BMUK) training 
course and are American Polygraph Association (APA) accredited. 
c) 166 polygraph tests were completed by the force polygraph team in 2019. The 
number of individuals deemed to have failed the polygraph test, or assessed to a 
borderline result, was 72. Even if the number of tests conducted only equated to one 
per individual, this would mean that 43% of individuals were deemed to have ‘failed’ 
a test. 
d) The interventions or consequences stemming from a test vary case-by-case 
depending on what the outcome of the test is (such as any pertinent disclosures 
which need to be acted upon for safeguarding of children/adults) and at the Offender 
Managers’ and police officers’ discretion. At present, a failed test will be logged as 
an intelligence report. 
These responses uphold our grave concerns around consistency of methodology, 
links with commercial interests, and the potential consequences of a ‘failed’ test.  
Holding the failed test outcome as intelligence could have serious consequences for 
an individual, as it could be used to justify further action including intrusive 
investigatory or surveillance measures, with intelligence subject to dissemination in 
contexts that may be unforeseen. 
The human rights argument 
 
As outlined above, the use of the polygraph can engage Article 5 ECHR (right to 
liberty and security of the person) insofar as any adverse statement made by the 
interviewee either during, or after the end of the polygraph session, may lead to 
enforcement proceedings (licence recall). It is, however, the Government’s view, as 
 
86 Marion Oswald (2020) Technologies in the twilight zone: early lie detectors, machine learning and 
reformist legal realism, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 34:2, 214-231, DOI: 
10.1080/13600869.2020.1733758. 
87 Norfolk Constabulary. 
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expressed in the ECHR memorandum (Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020) 
that the polygraph measures do not breach Article 5 ‘as detention will be in 
accordance with the sentence of imprisonment as set by the court’.88 The 
Government cites Whiston89 to support its view, specifically that: 
 
‘Where a person is lawfully sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment by a 
competent court, there is (at least in the absence of unusual circumstances) no 
question of his being able to challenge his loss of liberty during that term on the 
ground that it infringes article 5(4). [right of a detained person to challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention before a tribunal] […] the notion that the article is not 
engaged because of the original sentence appears entirely principled, and the 
consequence that a person under such a regime has to rely on his domestic 
remedies, at least unless other Convention rights are engaged, seems to me to be 
not unreasonable in practice.’90 [per Lord Neuberger]. 
 
We strongly disagree on both a doctrinal and empirical level with the Government’s 
view.  There is much that can be distinguished in the Whiston case when one 
considers the use of the polygraph in the recall process.  Despite recent attempts to 
normalise the polygraph, it would, we would argue, count as ‘unusual circumstances’ 
engaging other Convention rights as discussed below, thus permitting a challenge to 
the requirement of polygraph testing as a licence condition (refusal of which results 
in recall). The custodial sentence set by the court does not give a carte blanche to 
Probation officers, nor does the criminal conviction authorise an anything-goes 
(arbitrary) behaviour. According to the Strasburg Court’s jurisprudence, any 
deprivation of liberty has to be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the 
individual from arbitrariness.91 In the Government’s view then, any licence recall is 
implicitly authorised by the custodial sentence as set by the court. However, the 
notion of arbitrariness in Article 5(1) ECHR extends beyond conformity with national 
law. The deprivation of liberty may be lawful with regards to domestic law but still 
arbitrary in view of the Convention rights.92 For domestic law has in turn to be 
compliant with the Convention, which includes general principles salient in English 
law too, such as the rule of law; legal certainty, and non-arbitrariness.93  
Furthermore, and whether or not Article 5 is engaged, common law rules of 
procedural fairness apply which may require inter alia an oral hearing prior to any 
licence revocation and consideration of whether refusal of a polygraph test is a 
legally relevant consideration to the recall decision. As Lord Slynn set out in West, ‘in 
respect of determinate sentence prisoners the decisions taken (where such 
revocation has been ordered) can have a serious effect on the liberty of the 
applicant. If the decision is taken on the basis of a misunderstanding of the law or of 
 
88 Ministry of Justice/Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020: ECHR Memorandum, 
May 2020 para 17 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-and-sentencing-bill 
(last accessed: 01/09/2020) 
89 R (on the application of Whiston) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Justice (Respondent) [2014] 
UKSC 39. 
90 Ibid paras 38, 40. 
91 S., V., and A. v. Denmark App no 35553/12, 36678/12 and 36711/12 (ECtHR 22 Oct 2018 [GC], 
para 74; Witold Litwa v. Poland App no 26629/95 (ECtHR 4 Apr 2000), para 78. 
92 A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 Feb 2009) [GC], para 164; 
Creang 
ă v. Romania, App no 29226/03 (ECtHR 23 Feb 2012), para 84. 
93 Plesó v Hungary App no 41242/08 (ECtHR 02 Jan 2013), para 59. 
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a failure to appreciate the facts relied on there can be a very serious interference 
with the prisoner's liberty albeit that liberty is a conditional right.’94   
 
In its ECHR Memorandum, the Government accepts that Article 6 (right to a fair trial) 
is engaged by the use of polygraph, in relation to the transfer of information to the 
police and in the civil context in respect of TPIMs, yet fails to address the issues that 
we identify in the non-oppression and containment sections above, the ‘potentially 
oppressive’ use of polygraph ‘evidence’ in the application for a TPIM or that refusal 
to submit to a polygraph examination would become a breach of a TPIM measure 
and thus an offence.95 
 
In respect of Article 8 (right to respect for private life), the Government merely 
asserts that any interference is ‘justified […] owing to the significant risk to the public 
potentially posed by this cohort of offenders in the current environment.’  Despite this 
concern with risk, it is irrational, and frankly astonishing from a public protection 
perspective, for the Government to be relying on the polygraph test to determine if a 
TPIM subject ‘complies with his measures’96 i.e. as to whether an individual is telling 
the truth, and so as a determination of whether TPIM or release conditions can be 
relaxed.  We can easily envisage the claim that could arise pursuant to the positive 
obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR (right to life and freedom from torture 
respectively) where death or harm occurs due to the de-prioritisation of protective or 
investigative measures following a (negative) polygraph output. 
Returning to Article 8, in Corbett, the claimant challenged his polygraph licence 
condition imposed as part of the initial pilot as a disproportionate interference with 
Article 8.  The High Court disagreed; although there was an interference, it was 
justified under Article 8.2 grounds given the seriousness of the initial serious sexual 
offences and the denial of those offences by the claimant following his release on 
licence.97  While this case appears on the face of it to support the Government’s 
assertion, we would suggest a number of caveats.  This case is over a decade old 
and relates only to the context of the initial polygraph pilot.  It is clear from the 
judgment that the court placed weight on the claimant’s offending and apparent 
failure to take responsibility for his crimes.  The court paid no attention to the 
operation of the polygraph test itself and whether it was necessary for the purposes 
of offender management in terms of its effectiveness and validity.  Nor did the court 
weigh up proportionality in accordance with the typical four-stage proportionality 
test.98 The second part of such test in particular (are the measures which have been 
designed to meet the objective rationally connected to it?) would, we would argue, 
present a considerable hurdle to the proponents of the polygraph. 
Finally, in this sub-section, we would highlight our findings from our FOI research 
discussed above which has established considerable inconsistencies in the attitudes, 
practices and transparency across police forces in respect of the use of the 
 
94 Regina v. Parole Board (Respondents) ex parte Smith (FC) (Appellant) and Regina v. Parole Board 
(Respondents) ex parte West (FC) (Appellant) (Conjoined Appeals) [2005] UKHL 1, para 48. 
95 Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020: ECHR Memorandum, paras 20 and 21 and 69. 
96 Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020: ECHR Memorandum, para 70. 
97 Corbett v Secretary of State for Justice & Anor, [2010] HRLR 3, Para 31. 
98 Wilson LJ in R. (on the application of Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 
UKSC 45 at 45. 
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polygraph.  Furthermore, our research has uncovered the use of the polygraph as a 
bail condition connected to a community sentence known as the C2 programme 
operated by Hertfordshire Constabulary.99 The programme is aimed at ‘prolific 
offenders’ and is not therefore limited to sex offenders as set out in the 2007 Act.  As 
at the date of writing, there is little publicly available information regarding the use of 
polygraphs within this programme.  Replies to our FOI request stated that some tests 
are mandatory as they are set as a bail condition, with other tests being ‘voluntary’.  
We were also informed that ‘use of the testing equipment may extend and be used 
as part of the assessment stage i.e. asking a candidate if they have been fully 
honest about their admissions of crimes and motivation to long term change.’100  This 
therefore suggests that polygraphs are deployed to assess whether individuals have 
admitted all offences as part of their continuation in the programme, raising 
questions around the presumption of innocence and forced self-incrimination.  As far 
as we have been able to establish, there are no statutory provisions permitting or 
governing the deployment of polygraphs in this manner as part of bail or community 
sentences.  The police force in question stated ‘there is currently no legislation that 
specifically refers to the police use of polygraph either for sex offenders or for the c2 
project.’101   
It is debatable therefore whether there can be said to be the necessary quality and 
accessibility of law governing the use of the polygraph, and therefore whether 
interference with Article 8 is in accordance with law.  The Court of Appeal in Bridges 
accepted the ‘relativist approach’ to the quality of law: that the more intrusive the act 
complained of, the more precise and specific the law must be to justify it.102 A 
polygraph test is both physically and mentally intrusive.  As held in Bridges in respect 
of automated live facial recognition, we contend that leaving deployment of the 
polygraph to the discretion of police forces – potentially expanding usage to bail, 
sentence and investigation – would not satisfy the required quality of law from a 
human rights perspective too. 
Final Thoughts 
 
No-one would wish to see another fatal attack like the one committed by Usman 
Khan, a terrorist offender who had been released on licence half-way through a 16 
year sentence.103  In the aftermath of such terrible events, the temptation to grasp at 
a solution that promises certainty and truth is an understandable one.  Yet – as Lord 
Lloyd pointed out – the polygraph is not English.  Its use upholds none of the 
standards that our legal order in general and the penal system in particular do – or 
should – hold dear, and raises considerable concerns around individual rights and 
the quality of law governing its use. When, inevitably, someone who was 
polygraphed goes on to commit an offence, awkward (possibly: career-ending) 
questions to ministers will follow. The promise to provide certainty for decision-
makers is – at its best— a false one; as fictional detective Father Brown pointed out, 
 
99 https://www.herts.police.uk/Information-and-services/About-us/C2-Programme  
100 FOI response from Hertfordshire Constabulary to us – 28 July 2020. 
101 FOI response from Hertfordshire Constabulary – 28 August 2020. 
102 [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, para 83. 
103 ‘London Bridge: What we know about the attack’ BBC News, 3 December 2019 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50594810.  
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a polygraph is as valueless as the medieval idea that blood would issue from a 
corpse if its murderer touched it: ‘no machine can lie […] nor can it tell the truth.’104 
 
We therefore call for an urgent moratorium on any further use of the polygraph, 
together with an independent and public investigation into all current deployments 
within the police and other public bodies. Thinking realistically and knowing that our 
criticism, however severe, will not make the law go away, we suggest that its use 
should, without delay, become subject to regulation, independent oversight and 
scrutiny based on legal principles, not hypothecated but unproveable utility. We trust 
that these legal principles, inter alia: rationality, respect for the individual and 
accountability, will show that the polygraph cannot have legal validity.  Lie detectors 
are the things of spy dramas, sci-fi and children’s literature and perhaps after such 
an investigation, that is where they should be consigned. 
 
104 G.K. Chesterton, The Mistake of the Machine (1914). 
